Understanding War

A Matter of National Security: The Reinstitution of the Draft

Adrian R. Lewis

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are too small to do all that is asked and required of them. The American people need to reinstitute conscription. Some argue this is not possible, primarily because the United States is no longer a cohesive, unified nation, and because Americans are culturally damaged. In other words, a consumer culture has produced individuals who are basically selfish, people who are incapable of sacrificing for the greater good. Consider the words of Andrew Bacevich, written in his recent book, The Limits of Power: “As for the hope that reinstituting conscription might reenergize politics, it’s akin to the notion that putting Christ back in Christmas will reawaken American spirituality. A pleasant enough fantasy, it overlooks the forces that transformed a religious holiday into an orgy of consumption in the first place.” Is this true? Is this who we are as a people on the morning of the 21^st Century?

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are over committed and stretched beyond their capacity to succeed in all of their missions. They, and the families of their soldiers and marines, are being worn out physically, psychologically, and emotionally by constant deployments. And, the United States lacks the strategic reserve to respond immediately to significant, serious threats in various parts of the world. This is a matter of national security. The United States needs to significantly expand the size of the Army and

Marine Corps. The only way to do this in the current political environment is to reinstitute the draft. While there is ample evidence to support Bacevich’s conclusion, the American people have not been asked to serve. There has been no national debate.

Political leaders have lacked the courage to initiate it. Hence, the Army and the Marine Corpse need to initiate the debate.

In the years following the Vietnam War the Armed Forces of the United States formed a “military cluster” (0.5% of U.S. households) a professional fighting force with its own unique system and set of values, ethics, and beliefs. They fought the wars of the United States from 1973 to the present. With the end of the draft in 1973, American people were effectively removed from the conduct of the nation’s wars. This has had, and continues to have, a number of significant ramifications, all of which cannot be explored in these few pages; however, the net effect, while still unacknowledged, has been disastrous for the nation, the Armed Forces, and national security.

After the horrendous attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration declared war on terrorism, promulgated a new, aggressive strategic doctrine of “Preemptive War,” and committed part of the nation to a Global War on Terrorism. These declarations led to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the deployment of U.S. forces in other parts of the world. To fight this war the Bush Administration relied on forces in existence. It made no effort to mobilize the American people for what they acknowledge would be a long, difficult struggle, and through its bellicose rhetoric and black and white view of the world, it told allies they were not necessary. Thus, almost the entire burden of Bush’s global war on terrorism fell on regular, professional Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Out of 300 million Americans the burden of war fell on less than 1 percent of the American people. The war was not a national effort. In fact, it is wrong to say that the United States is at war. It is more accurate to say that the Armed Forces of the United States are at war. Thus far, the American people are either

spectators, or disinterested bystanders. They have no duties, no responsibilities, and no commitments. After declaring war the Bush Administration instituted tax cuts and quite literally told the American people to go shopping. Bush never asked the American people to the make the sacrifices typical in America’s war. He did not appeal to the better nature of the American people. He appealed to greed, to selfishness. This was not the traditional American response to war, and this was not traditional role of American Presidents in war.

*          *          *          *          *

Why is conscription necessary at this time? The threats facing the United States are real, substantial and growing. The presents of the Armed Forces of the United States in various parts of the world have created stability, making it possible for peoples of these regions to grow their economies without fear of invasion form their neighbors. From Korea to Europe U.S. forces have maintained the status quo. The unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces under the Rumsfeld Pentagon while necessary to meet the growing demands for forces created new opportunities for aggression. The strategic reserves of the United States, now consists primarily of air and naval power. U.S. ground forces cannot respond with substantial forces to new threats or the renewed activities of old threats. Still, neither of the Presidential candidates, Obama or McCain, have had the political courage and/or knowledge of national security to explain to the American people the dangers prevalent

in the current environment, and called for restoration of the draft. Consider briefly the following problems and threats:

—U. S. counter-insurgency doctrine required four to five hundreds of thousands of soldiers to succeed in a country the size and population of Iraq, yet the United States

was incapable of deploying and sustaining two-hundred thousand troops in Iraq. While some level stability has been achieve in the past couple of years, it is fragile, and will most likely require the presence of substantial American forces for many years.

—In Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces are recovering. NATO allies have not provided the forces or leadership necessary to prevent this resurgence, and the United States is incapable of deploying two additional brigades, 10,000 soldiers, to the region to counter the enemy’s efforts.

—On the Korean peninsula, the stability of the government of North Korea is uncertain. A change in leadership seems to be in process. This is always a period of uncertainty Communist dictatorship, because they systems lack the institutions and constitutional authority required for an orderly transition of leadership. Yet, the United States has withdrawn most of the ^2nd Infantry Division from South Korea.

—A few months ago Russia, the former Soviet Union, invaded Georgia, demonstrating that it is not satisfied with the status quo. Russia has also worked to destabilize the government in the Ukraine. Yet the United States has withdrawn the bulk of two corps from Europe.

—The People’s Republic of China is rapidly expanding its navy, particularly its fleet of quiet, diesel submarines. The United States is still responsible for the security of Taiwan. China has also rapidly and impressively advanced its ability to destroy communication satellites; in other words, to disrupt American communications and computer systems and guidance systems on precision weapons. It is also modernizing its ground forces. Yet the United States retains no significant strategic reserve committed to conventional war.

—Iran is rapidly developing nuclear and missile technologies; and will, in roughly two to five years, by some estimates, possess the wherewithal to produce nuclear weapons and missiles capable of striking Europe.

—The rapprochement between Russia and China aligns two of the most powerful nations on Earth, both of which are allied to Iran, and have no affinity for the United States.

—Pakistan, a state that possesses nuclear weapons, is going through a period of instability and seems to be disintegrating. The new government is under pressure from the army, and lacks significant public support. The disintegration of the government of Pakistan directly influences decisions and actions in India, which is also a nuclear power.

—American influence in Europe has declined to almost nothing. The European Union is poorly armed, and frequently seems more willing to react to Russia than the United States. Given its dependence on Russian and foreign oil and gas, and the dismissive, go-it-alone attitude of the Bush Administration this is understandable.

In the face of all these threats the Armed Forces of the United States, particularly the Army and Marine Corps, are immersed and over-committed in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has focused its thinking and resources almost exclusively on counterinsurgency operations and doctrine. No terrorist organization, no undeveloped country, no failed state possesses the wherewithal to do more than minor damage to the United States. However, China, Russian, North Korea, India and Pakistan, can dramatically alter the international situation. The mere presence of U.S. forces creates stability, serves a deterrent to aggression, and serves as an acknowledgement of America’s commitment to peace in the region. The absence of American forces is an

invitation to aggression. The U.S. needs to maintain a significant strategic reserve of ground forces ready to deploy and conduct conventional operations, and it needs to maintain a significant presence in ground forces in various regions of the Earth, if we are prevent war. The Bush Administration has overcommitted U.S. forces to one region of the planet, and by doing so has created vulnerabilities in other regions. The Obama Administrations needs to restore balance, and the only way to do this is to significantly increase the size of American ground forces.

*           *          *          *          *

Clinton used to say he despised the military, but at least he listened to us. Bush says he loves the military, but he never listens to us.

                                                            —Army, Pentagon Strategist

My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight [in
Iraq] was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions—or bury the results.[1] 

                                                —Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, USMC, 2007

Ignorance of war is killing Americans. The lack of will of the American people and their government to develop a comprehensive understanding of war and the limitation of American military power, and some respect for non-Western peoples and cultures, is killing Americans in foreign lands, wasting enormous national resources, alienating traditional and potential allies, creating new enemy states, growing new terrorists, and causing the decline of the United States.

Consider these basic tenets of war. Before starting war nation-states should: 1. Have well defined, legitimate political objectives. 2. Know its enemies, the types of war they are most likely to fight, and their ability to generate combat power. 3. Have sufficient forces to fight the war, and the right types and mix of forces—force structure. 4. Develop a comprehensive strategy. 5. Use tested operational and tactical doctrines adapted to the specific political, economic, cultural, and geographic environment. 6. Secure the support of legitimate allies to share the costs and sacrifices of war. 7. Make the war a national effort, gain and maintain the support of the people. 8. Listen to the advice of professional military leaders, and know the capabilities and limitations of one’s forces. These are common sense tenets and principles of war, yet the Administration of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney failed in every instance repeating past behaviors. Consider the words of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara: “We failed to ask the five most basic questions: Was it true that the fall of South Vietnam would trigger the fall of all
Southeast Asia? Would that constitute a grave threat to the West’s security? What kind of war—conventional or guerrilla—might develop? Could we win it with
U.S. troops fighting alongside the South Vietnamese? Should we not know the answers to all these questions before deciding whether to commit troops…?” The questions that needed to be asked were known, and the right answers were available. In reference to the Bush-Cheney War in
Iraq, General Newbold wrote:

I was a Marine Corps lieutenant general and director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After 9/11, I was witness and therefore a party to the actions that led us to the invasion of
Iraq—an unnecessary war…. What we are living with now are the consequences of successive policy failures. Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, the initial denial that an insurgency was the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in more robust ways to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of agencies of our government to commit assets to the same degree as the Defense Department.[2] 

The lessons of the Vietnam War were not forgotten, and there was no lack of knowledge or information. This was voluntary ignorance, willful neglect, caused in part by cultural blindness. This is not a problem unique to this administration. Since World War II, it has become a chronic, American problem. These repeated failures in strategic vision and military thinking requires explanations that go beyond reason, logic, and common sense. There were men in the Pentagon who understood war and endeavored to explain the costs and nature of war in
Iraq. There were professional soldiers and marines in the Pentagon who well understood the resources required for war, and the chain of actions that produce the highest probability of success. To be sure, there were disagreements between the services; however, this does explain the manifold failures of the Bush-Cheney Administration. Hence, the larger questions are not, what were the lessons of the Vietnam War and what questions needed to be asked, but why did American political leadership continuously ignore its most knowledgeable people, and why didn’t they ignore the information and intelligence available?

[1] Gregory Newbold, Lieutenant General, USMC, “Why
Iraq Was a Mistake,” Time, April 9, 2006, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629-1,00.html.

[2] Newbold, “Why
Iraq Was a Mistake,” Time, April 9, 2006.

Welcome to Blogs.informa.com. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start blogging!